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officers for entries made with the intent to deceive the examiner make less urgent an
additional deterrent in the form of civil liability. New York Penal Law 1930, c. 41
§ 304. Cf. Mass. Gen. L. 1932, c. 226, § 53A; Smith-Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, c.
i61, § 4. It is noteworthy, moreover, that criminal prosecution for making false entries may encounter a logical difficulty as a result of the instant decision since the note,
being enforceable against the maker, is not fictitious.
Although the application of a rule requiring either bad faith or reliance for recovery
would generally result in the liability of the accommodator since the character of the
transaction primafade implies bad faith, the rule would be sufficiently flexible to prevent injustice in a proper case. In the instant case the bank's request was made more
plausible by past dealings related to the accommodation note. Since there was no
showing either of damage to strangers or of an intent to deceive on the part of the
accommodator, the imposition of liability with its consequent windfall for the bank
was unfortunate.
Building and Loan Associations-Constitutionality of Statute Limiting Withdrawals by Representative of Deceased Stockholder-[Oklahoma].-The plaintiff was
the executor of a stockholder who purchased his stock in the defendant building and
loan association in 193o. An Oklahoma statute of 1921 provided that "upon the death
of a stockholder his legal representative shall be entitled to receive the full amount
paid in by him and legal interest thereon ..... Okla. Stat. 1921 , § 98oo. Three months
prior to the stockholder's death, the statute was amended to provide that "upon the
death of a stockholder his legal representative shall be entitled to receive the full
amount paid in by him and such proportion of the profits as the by-laws may determine
... less a proportionate share of any loss sustained by such association." Okla. L.
1933, c. 54. At the time of the stockholder's death the defendant had sustained losses;
and since this case was decided has been placed in receivership. The plaintiff claimed
the amount due under the 1921 act on the ground that the amendment impaired the
contractual obligation of the defendant to pay and deprived the estate of property
without due process of law. Held, the 1921 statute gave the plaintiff a vested right of
which he could not constitutionally be deprived. Baker v. Tidsa Bldg. & L. Ass'n,
Okla. Sup. Ct. (Nov. 15, 1936) (rehearing pending).
Though the impairment of contract and due process clauses are relied upon by the
court, the ultimate question in this case is whether the state properly exercised its reserved power to alter and amend laws relating to corporations. Okla. Stats. 1931,
§ 9716. Whether or not a contract right is vested depends upon whether or not it is
subject to alteration under the reserve power. See Chitty, J., in Pepe v. City & Suburb
Bldg. Soc., [1893] 2 Ch. 331, 313-14; 4 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. i39 (1936). The principle
involved in the use of the reserve power is that of compromise between individual and
public interests. Home Bldg. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934); Fornatarov.
Atlantic CoastBldg. & L. Ass'n, io N.J. Misc. 1248, 163 At. 240 (1932). It is arguable
that the decision in this case contravenes both public and individual interests.
Building and loan associations are organized for mutual aid in financing home purchasing and construction. Thompson, Building Associations §§ 23, 314 (2d ed. 1899);
Thornton & Blackledge, Building Associations § 122 (2d ed. 1899). Because of their
importance in building development, these associations are considered quasi-public
and are subject to greater governmental control than ordinary private corporations.

RECENT CASES
See Cardozo, J., in Hopkins Federal Say. & L. Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935);
PrudentialBldg. & L. Ass'n v. Shaw, rig TeX. 228, 26 S.W. (2d) 168 (ig3o). With respect to individual interests, a building and loan association is mutual and cooperative,
all members being equally entitled to share in the assets in proportion to their contributions. Fornatarov. Atlantic Coast Bldg. & L. Ass'n., io N.J. Misc. 1248, 163 Atl.
240 (1932). It has been held to be a good defense to an action by a withdrawing shareholder to show that full payment to the plaintiff would deprive the remaining members
of part of their proportionate share in the existing assets. Richman v. HerculesBldg. &
L. Ass'n, unreported, cited in Fornatarov. Atlantic Coast Bldg. & L. Ass'n, io N.J.
Misc. 1248, 1254, 163 Ad. 240, 242 (1932). This result follows from the special definition of insolvency which has been applied to building and loan associations. Such associations are deemed insolvent when they are unable to pay their stockholders the
amount of their contributions dollar for dollar. Mott v. Western Say. & L. Ass'n., 142
Ore. 344, 20 P. (2d) 236 (1933); Towle v. Am. B., L. & Inv. Soc., 6i Fed. 446 (D.C. Ill.
1894). When insolvency supervenes, mutuality compels mutual participation in the
reduced assets, even though some members have given notice of withdrawal which has
matured; consequently the right of withdrawal is suspended in the absence of some
express provision to the contrary. Aldrich v. Gray, 147 Fed. 453 (C.C.A. 6th i9o6);
49 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1142 n. (x914); Endlich, Building Associations § 511 (2d ed. 1895);
Thompson, Building Associations § 289 (2d ed. 1899). The effect of the holding in
the present case is that one stockholder of an insolvent building and loan association
has a "vested" right to reduce the proportionate share of all the other stockholders in
the existing assets, even though by the same reasoning every other member must have
the same "vested" right to be paid in full in the event of his death. Substantially, the
1933 statute suspended the right of the plaintiff to sue for the full amount paid in as
long as the association remained insolvent. This is no more than the courts of some
jurisdictions have already accomplished without statutes. See Brown v. Victor Bldg.
Ass'n, 302 Pa. 254, 153 Atl. 349 (1931).

Conflict of Laws-Applicable Law in Determining whether Instrument is Sealed
within the Meaning of Statute of Limitations-[Georgia].-Suit was brought in
Georgia on a written promise to pay money which was executed and payable in Florida.
Under Florida law the instrument embodying this promise, although it did not recite
that it was sealed, would be considered as sealed. A Georgia statute provided that
for purposes of determining the period of limitations, an instrument was not under seal unless the body of the instrument contained a recitation of this fact. The
period of limitations for simple contracts established by the Georgia Code had elapsed,
but the limitation for actions on sealed instruments containing a recitation that such
instruments were sealed had not elapsed. Held, dismissal of suit afirmed. Instruments
were not sealed within meaning of the Georgia statute of limitations. Alropa Corp. v.
Rossee, 86 F. (2d) ri8 (C.C.A. 5th 1936).
In applying the conflict of laws principle that the validity of a contract may be
governed by foreign law while the procedure to be followed is always that of the law
of the forum, American courts are unanimous in holding that the period of limitations
on contracts is an incident of procedure. 3 Beale, Conflict of Laws §§ 584.1, 6o3.i
(1935). But it has been suggested that limitation of action, analytically, is a substan-

